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Callicott: Reply 
most fruitful and important research opportunities for 
twenty-first century ecology is the development of 
objective norms for the health of dynamic ecosystems. 
Once formulated, such norms might tentatively 
govern our environmental behavior. Ecology will never 
be a science more exact than medicine. So we should 
always be prepared to change our notions of what is 
good for nature, just as we are prepared to change our 
notions of what is good for our bodies. But again, 
environmentalphilosophy should not concern itself with 
formulating and reformulating specific norms of 
environmental health and integrity. That is a job for 
ecologists. We philosophers should busy ourselves, 
rather, with connecting ecological "facts" (Le., 
ecological hypotheses and theories) with values, and 
with trying to show, as I do in my book, that it is no less 
incumbent upon us to be solicitous of the health and 
integrity (however tentatively defmed) of (changing, 
evolving) biotic communities than of the health and 
integrity of (changing, aging) human persons and of 
(changing, developing) human societies. 
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Professor Callicott's reply to my analysis of his 
claims reminds me of my favorite philosophical 
exchange, a conversation penned by Lewis Carroll. 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said to Alice, 
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more 
nor less." But, as Alice reminded him, "The question 
is ...whether you can make words mean so many 
different things."I This is precisely my question to 
Professor Callicott. Can you make words-like 
"evolution," "community," and "norm,"-mean so 
many different things, claiming one meaning in one 
argument, and an incompatible meaning in another? 
In his "Reply," Professor Callicott states: "I nowhere 
suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous." Yet., 
as I quoted in my review, Callicott claims: The 
"conceptual and logical foundations of the land ethic" 
are a "Darwinian protosociobiological natural history 
of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of 
life on earth.... Its logic is that natural selection has 
endowed human beings with an affective moral 
response to perceived bonds ofkinship and community 
membership and identity."2 Value "in the philosophical 
sense," says Callicott, "is a newly discovered proper 
object of a specially evolved "publick affection" or 
"moral sense" which all psychologically normal human 
beings have inherited from a long line of primates."3 It 
is logically inconsistent for Callicott to claim that 
evolution and natural selection provide the foundations 
of the land ethic, then, once someone points out the 
problematic logical consequences of this position, to 
deny espousing evolutionary ethics. 
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Similar difficulties plague Callicou's conception 
of community, as I noted in my review. In his "Reply," 
Callicott claims: "if the concept of a human com­
munity is coherent and robust enough to support 
anthropocentric moral obligations... then the concept 
of a biotic community-since no less coherent and 
robust-is coherent and robust enough to support 
ecocentric moral obligations." His claim does not wode, 
however, because of the incompatible properties that 
Callicott aUributes to biotic and human communities. 
In Callicott's book, he says that we humans "remain 
members of the human community," and that we have 
"moral responsibilities ... to respect universal human 
rights."" Yet, Callicottalso claims: "Not only are other 
sentient creatures members of the biotic community 
and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and stability; 
so are we.,,5 Either certain universal human rights have 
primacy, or the biotic community has primacy. For both 
to have primacy is impossible. Or, as Alice phrased it, 
to the Queen: "One can't believe impossible things.'06 
Finally, in his "Reply," Callicott denies my charge 
that his ethics is not normative by claiming that his 
ethics is normative in the sense in which a body 
temperature of 98.6 degrees "provides a norm against 
which we measure deviations-fever and hypothermia" 
That is, Callicott claims that his ethics (like a norm in 
medicine) is statistically nonnative. My review charged, 
however, that his ethics was not ethically normative. viz.: 
one cannot be praised for acting in accord with
 
natural selection. Either a certain ethical
 
tendency is selected for, or it is not. This
 
means that behavioral uniformities that are
 
explained through natural selection are
 
descriptive, nOI normative. Hence Callicott
 
has admittedly saved his ethics from relativism,
 
but at the price of its "oughtness" or normative
 
character.
 
Callicott cannot answer the charge ofhis denying ethical 
norms by responding that his ethics has statistical norms. 
Statistical norms always tell us what behavior is most 
probable or frquenl, in the sense of statistical frequency. 
Ethical norms do nol 
Where does this exchange leave us? At the least, 
with some agreement. As Callicott correctly put it in 
his "Reply,": "ecology does not provide us with 
objective dynamic norms of ecosystemic health." 
Further, our exchange suggests that, just as scientific 
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progress comes from a plurality of theories, so also 
progress in environmental ethics likely will come fron 
a plurality of philosophical approaches-such as 
Callicott's work, rooted in a profound grasp of moral 
theory, and my own work, grounded in biology and 
philosophy of science. My recommendation for the 
future is that we take the advice of Ernst Mayr and 
analyze the key concepts of environmental ethics, 
concepts like "evolution," "community" and "norm," 
as Callicott and I have done. Mayr said that the 
"spectacular recent progress" in evolutionary theory was 
not due to improvements in measurement but due to 
improvements in the clarification of concepts? The 
same can be said for much of environmental ethics. 
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